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FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc. v. Helfer.A Case for an Implied Private Cause of Action

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1933, Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) to "ensure maintenance of the going concern
value of failed banks and to avoid significant disruption in banking
services."' In order to accomplish this goal, Congress vested the
FDIC with broad powers.2 For example, the FDIC has the authority to prescribe rules regarding the conduct of receiverships3 as
well as the ability to succeed to title of assets and all rights of any
shareholders, officers, and directors of the insured institution.4
Once these powers are assumed, the FDIC as receiver can liquidate an institution and use the proceeds of that liquidation to pay
valid claims.5 Balanced against the powers of the FDIC are duties
of accounting and reporting.6 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc. v. Helfer held that a shareholder of a
bank has a private cause of action under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15);
therefore, a shareholder is able to sue the FDIC for a statutorily
required accounting report. 7 This case arose when the sharehold1. First Pacific Bancorp, Inc. v. Heifer, 224 F.3d 1117,1120 (9" Cir. 2000) (citing
Jones v. FDIC, 748 F.2d 1400, 1402 (10' Cir. 1984)).
2. Id.
3. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(1) (1994). The statute states: "The [FDIC] may prescribe
such regulations as the [FDIC] determines to be appropriate regarding the conduct of
conservatorships or receiverships." Id.
4. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A) (1994). "The [FDIC] shall ...by operation of the
law, succeed to-(i) all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the insured depository
institution, and of any shareholder, member, accountholder, depositor, officer, or director of such institution with respect to the institution and the assets of the institution.... " Id.
5. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(1)(E) (1994). The statute allows the FDIC to "place the
insured depository institution in liquidation and proceed to realize upon the assets of
the institution, having due regard to the conditions of credit in the locality." Id.
6. First PacificBancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1120. These duties include maintaining, in accordance with established accounting and reporting practices, a full accounting of each receivership. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15) (1994).
7. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15) (1994); FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d 1117,1129
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ers of First Pacific Bancorp, expecting a receivership surplus in the
neighborhood of $2.8 million, received only six pages of unaudited
reports from the FDIC indicating a net loss for the receivership.8
The Ninth Circuit's decision was contrary to the Third Circuit
Court's ruling in Hindes v. FDIC decided in 1998. 9 Consequently,
the issue is on uncertain ground in other jurisdictions and may, in a
future case, be appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),'0 an amendment to the original
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, imposes accounting and recordkeeping requirements on the FDIC." Under FIRREA, the FDIC
must maintain a full accounting of each receivership consistent
with FDIC's own accounting and reporting practices. 2 Additionally, the FDIC must provide an annual accounting or report to the
Secretary of the Treasury, to the Comptroller of the Currency, to
the authority that appointed the FDIC as receiver, 3 and, upon request, to any shareholder of the depository institution or to any
other member of the public. 4 Although these reports are required
(9th Cir. 2000).
8. Holding Company Wants Accounting of FDIC's Receivership, 4 BANK &
LENDER LIABILITY LrITG. REP. 5 Sept. 2,1998 at 5, 1998 WL 4 No.1 ANBLLLR 5.

9. Hindes v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 148, 172 (3rd Cir. 1998). Hindes is factually similar
to First Pacific Bancorp, Inc. in that the plaintiffs in Hindes felt the accounting reports created by the FDIC were,insufficient. Id. at 171-72. The plaintiffs in Hindes
brought suit against the FDIC, inter alia, to enforce the accounting and reporting
provisions in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15). Id. at 171. The case was appealed to the Third
Circuit where it was dismissed because the court found no private cause of action existed in favor of the plaintiffs. Id. at 172.
'
10. FirstPacificBancorp,Inc., 224 F.3d at 1120.
11. Id. at 1126-27.

12. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15)(A) (1994). The statute specifically requires "the
[FDIC] as conservator or receiver shall, consistent with the accounting and reporting
and practices and procedures established by the [FDIC], maintain a full accounting of
each conservatorship and receivership or other disposition of institutions in default."
Id.
13. Id. § 1821(d)(15)(B). For each receivership to which the FDIC was appointed, the statute requires that "the [EDIC] shall make an annual accounting or
report, as appropriate, available to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Comptroller
General of the United States, and the authority which appointed the Corporation as

conservator or receiver." Id.
14. Id. § 1821(d)(15)(C). The central issue of the FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc. case
is the language italicized below. The section states that "[a]ny report prepared pursuant to subparagraph (B) shallbe made availableby the Corporationupon request to
any shareholderof the depository institutionfor which the Corporation was appointed
conservator or receiver or any other member of the public." Id. (emphasis added).
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under FIRREA, it is unclear if a shareholder has the power to
compel the FDIC to adhere to the requirements. The court addressed this question in FirstPacificBancorp, Inc. v. Helfer.'"
This Note examines the facts of FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc.
v. Helfer, its history in the district court,' 6 and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeal's resolution of the issues presented by the case. 7
The Note then reviews the relevant case law, as well as the evolution of, and the controversy surrounding the test for an implied
cause of action. 8 Next, the Note analyzes First Pacific Bancorp,
Inc., comparing its holding with the those in the background
cases. 9 Finally, the Note discusses the impact of the decision in
FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc. on the banking industry." It concludes
that the Ninth Circuit Court was correct in its holding and recommends that other jurisdictions and the Supreme Court follow the
Ninth Circuit's precedent.2 '
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The plaintiff in First Pacific Bancorp, Inc., First Pacific
Bancorp (First Pacific),22 is a one-bank holding company and the
exclusive shareholder of First Pacific Bank. 23 On August 7, 1990,
the FDIC was appointed as receiver for First Pacific by the Cali15. FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d 1117,1119-20 (9th Cir. 2000).
16. See infra notes 22-36 and accompanying text.

17. See infra notes 37-67 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 68-134 and accompanying text.

19. See infra notes 135-81 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 182-89 and accompanying text.

21. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
22. There are three shareholders of First Pacific Bancorp: Ada P. Sands, Leonard
S. Sands, and Michael Zugsmith. Each is also listed as a plaintiff in this case. (First
Pacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d 1117, 1119 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000)). However, the court
found that,
[a]Ithough all the plaintiffs are parties to the appeal.... only [First
Pacific] Bancorp can be treated as a "shareholder" within the
meaning of the statute. Only [First Pacific] Bancorp is a "shareholder of the depository institution for which the Corporation was
appointed ...receiver," 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15)(C). The individual plaintiffs are shareholders of [First Pacific] Bancorp, not First
Pacific Bank.
Id.
23. Id. at 1119.
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fornia Department of Banking.2 4 The following day the FDIC exercised its statutory power and began to liquidate First Pacific
25
Bank.
On May 7, 1996, the FDIC gave notice to the plaintiff that
it was terminating its six-year receivership.26 In addition to the notice, the FDIC sent the plaintiff two pages of unaudited financial
statements covering five years of the receivership from August 10,
1990, through December 31, 1995.27 First Pacific felt that the data
provided in the FDIC reports was insufficient and subsequently
requested additional financial data.21 In response, the FDIC provided four pages of financial data and claimed that it had met its
statutory obligations of reporting and accounting. 29 First Pacific
24. Id.
25. Holding Company, supra note 8, at 5. "According to appellants' brief, the
FDIC initially reported that the bank had assets of approximately $104,515,000, liabilities of about $100,241,000, and a receivership surplus of $4,274,000. However,
these figures do not include information on the FDIC's sale of the bank's deposits,
assets and business to Commercial Central Bank on Aug. 8.... " Id.

26. Id.
27. FirstPacificBancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1119. "One report was entitled 'Statement of Financial Condition,' and reported the assets, liabilities, and equity of the
bank as August 10, 1990 and as of December 31, 1995. The other statement, 'Financial Condition and Liquidation Activity,' reported aggregated amounts of receipts
and disbursements of [First Pacific Bank]." Id. The statements were bare bone and
no details were provided for the interim periods. Id.
The statement broke down the total amount of money received by
the FDIC during the five-plus year period into only two categories:
"Principal Collection and Interest Income on Assets, Net of Participant," reported at nearly $83 million, and "Receipts from FDIC
and Others," reported at over $20 million. The disbursements received similar treatment, reported in only two aggregate amounts:
"Liquidation and Other Disbursements" at nearly $84 million, and
"Payments to FDIC" totaling over $18 million.
Id. at 1119 n.1.
28. First Pacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d 1117,1119 (9th Cir. 2000). "Appellants
argue this report does not comply with generally accepted accounting principals
(GAAP) and is inaccurate because it still does not include the sale of accounts to
Commercial Central, or information on several large settlement which were negotiated during the FDIC's tenure." Holding Company, supra note 8, at 5.
29. Holding Company, supra note 8, at 5. The information the FDIC provided
included
an unaudited, one-page 'Statement of Income and Expenses,' detailing total liquidation income and expense, loss on assets, and net
loss from liquidation; an unaudited, one-page 'Statement of Cash
Receipts and Disbursements,' detailing liquidation receipts and
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was still not satisfied.3 °
After exhausting informal means of obtaining additional information, First Pacific filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California. 31 In its complaint, First Pacific requested an accounting of First Pacific Bank's financial condition
during the period the FDIC was acting as receiver. 32 More specifically, First Pacific filed to compel the FDIC to provide a financial
accounting, which conformed with FDIC's own accounting and reporting standards.33 On December 1, 1997, the court sustained a
summary judgment motion in favor of the FDIC. 34 The court
found "no authority that would allow plaintiffs to pursue a private
cause of action under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15) by questioning the
adequacy of the FDIC's financial reports., 35 First Pacific appealed
the district court's decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.36
When reviewing FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc., the Ninth Circuit analyzed the issue under the Supreme Court's decision in Cort
v. Ash.37 Cortpromulgated a four-prong test to determine whether
disbursements; and an unaudited, two-page document entitled

'Supplemental Information.' All documents involved the period
from August 10, 1990 through December 31, 1995.
FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1119. The FDIC also reported that the receivership had suffered a net loss rather than the initial $4,274,000 reported. Holding
Company, supra note 8, at 5.
30. FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1119.
31. Id. The court uses the term "informal" to describe the correspondence between First Pacific and the FDIC. Id. However, it seems that drafting letters objecting to the termination of the receivership and requesting additional financial informa-

tion may require a description a bit stronger than informal.
32. Id.

33. Id.
34. FirstPacific Bancorp,Inc., 224 F.3d 1117,1119 (9th Cir. 2000).

35. Id.
36. Id. at 119. While the Federal appeal was pending, "[First Pacific] filed a complaint against the FDIC in state court alleging breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and intentional misrepresentation and demanding as accounting pursuant
to state law." Id. at 1120. Subsequently, the FDIC removed the case to federal court

and filed for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id. The district court
sustained this motion in favor of the FDIC. Id. Plaintiffs also appealed this decision,
and it was consolidated with the original suit. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court on this matter holding that the plaintiffs were barred from bringing the
second suit by res judicata because the state law mirrored the federal law in the area.
Id. at 1128-29.

37. Id. at 1121-28. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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a private cause of action exists in a given statute.38 The Supreme
Court asked:
First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted - that is, does
the statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such
a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with
the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally,
is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the
States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
cause of action based solely on federal law?39
Using this test, the Ninth Circuit reversed the ruling of the
district court and found an implied private cause of action in the
language of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15)." Although the circuit court
found an implied private cause of action in favor of First Pacific,
the victory may be bittersweet. The circuit court remanded the
case to the district court for a determination of whether the reports
provided by the FDIC were in conformity with the requirements
of section 1821(d)(15).41
Under the first Cort factor, the circuit court held that §
1821(d)(15) singled out the shareholders of a bank as members of
the class the statute sought to protect. 2 The circuit court reasoned
that, "[w]hile the overarching goal of the [FDIC Act] is to protect
faith and confidence in the banking system and to ensure adequate
protection of the depositors through the insurance fund, share38. First Pacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1121. There is some dispute as to
whether the Cort factors are to be given the same weight or even if the test has been
overruled all together. Id. See also infranotes 136-41 and accompanying text (analyzing the Ninth Circuit's decision).
39. FirstPacificBancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Cort, 422 U.S. at 78).
40. FirstPacific Bancorp,Inc., 224 F.3d 1117,1121-28 (9th Cir. 2000).
41. Id. at 1128.
42. Id. at 1122. See also, supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing 12
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15)).
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holders are the specifically named beneficiaries in the subsection
at issue here."43 The circuit court pointed to the language of §
1821(d)(15)(C) and its requirement that the FDIC provide the
same accounting report to shareholders as to the government authorities listed in subparagraph (B). 4 The circuit court also found
that § 1821(d)(11)(C),4 5 "requires the same report to accompany
distributions to shareholders made pursuant to section
1821(d)(11)(A)(v)." 46 Finally, the court bolstered its conclusions
with comparison to other Supreme Court decisions and prior
Ninth Circuit cases.47
The Ninth Circuit also found the second Cort factor present
by concluding that Congress intended to permit or create a private
remedy.4 8 Although the record was silent on whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action,49 the circuit court held
that in order to enforce the duties owed to the shareholder by the

43. FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1122.
44. Id.
45. The statute states: "Any distribution by the [FDIC] in connection with any
claim described in subparagraph (A)(v) shall be accompanied by the accounting report requires under paragraph (15)(B)." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11)(C).
46. First Pacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d 1117,1122 (9th Cir. 2000). Paragraph
(11)(A) lists the order of priority in which amounts realized from the liquidation of
the receivership are distributed. Subparagraph (v) includes, "shareholders or members arising as a result of their status as shareholders or members (including any depository institution holding company or any shareholder or creditor of such company)." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11)(A)(v) (1994).
47. FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1122-23. The court compared FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc. with the Supreme Court decisions of Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677 (1979), Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), and California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981). Id. at 1122-23. See infra notes 81-119 and
accompanying text. In addition, the court referenced the previous Ninth Circuit decisions of Oliver v. Sealaska Corp., 192 F.3d 1220 (9' Cir. 1999) (holding that a private
right of action exists under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act because the
statute specifically required distribution of revenues to shareholders of the defendant
corporation.), Crow Tribe of Indians v. Campbell Farming Corp., 31 F.3d 768 (9th
Cir. 1994) (holding that a statute referring to "any Crow Indian" was enacted for the
benefit of an individual Crow Indian not for the tribe as a whole, and therefore, no
private cause of action existed in favor of the tribe.) and Burgertv. Lokelani Bernice
PauahiBishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that reference to Native
Hawaiians in a statute conferred a specific benefit on Native Hawaiians). Id. at 1123.
48. FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F3d at 1123-26.
49. Id. The court reasoned: "The absence of a statement of intent to create a
remedy does not necessarily mean that no remedy is available. Indeed, if that were
the case, the Supreme Court would not have developed a test for an implied private
right of action." Id. at 1124.
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FDIC, there must be a private cause of action available to the
shareholders." The court also observed that the Supreme Court
historically reserves remedies in equity for the courts unless a statute strongly indicates otherwise.51 Because the remedy (an accounting) sought by First Pacific is an equitable one, the circuit
court perceived Congress' silence as a presumption that a shareholder may pursue such an equitable claim. 2
Addressing the third Cort factor, the circuit court questioned whether a private cause of action is consistent with the purpose of FIRREA 3 As previously stated, one of the purposes of
enacting FIRREA was "'to improve the supervision of savings associations by strengthening capital, accounting, and other supervisory standards."' 54 . The court reasoned that "strengthened accounting standards elevate sunlight over secrecy., 55 In light of the
stated purposes of FIRREA, the court also found it unlikely that
Congress would enact unenforceable accounting requirements. 6
Therefore, because the statute does not specify which entities may
compel an accounting, 7 the circuit court held that those which the
statute enumerates to receive the accounting reports may enforce
the statutory provisions. 8 The Ninth Circuit concluded the statute
places shareholders on the same ground as the government agencies entitled to the accounting; 59 therefore, a private right of action
is consistent with the purposes of FIRREA
50. Id. at 1126.
51. Id. at 1125.
In fact the Supreme Court has observed: "unless a statute in so
many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts
the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction
is to be recognized and applied. The great principles of equity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences,
or doubtful construction."

Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1981))
52. FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d 1117,1125 (9th Cir. 2000).

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 1126-27.
Id. at 1126(quoting H.R CoNF. REP. No. 101-222, at 393 (1989)).
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1126-27.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15) (1994).

58. FirstPacificBancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d 1117,1127 (9th Cir. 2000).

59. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
60. FirstPacificBancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1127.
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Finally, the circuit court concluded the fourth Cort factor
was satisfied. 6 ' It found that the FDIC's accounting and reporting
duty arose under federal law.62 Consequently, the court held that
the cause of action could not be relegated to state law.63
As a result of the circuit court's finding that § 1821(d)(15)
satisfied each of the four Cort factors, it held that the statute creates a private right of action to compel an accounting in favor of
First Pacific. 64 The court recognized that its decision conflicted
65
with a divided Third Circuit Court decision in Hindes v. FDIC.
As discussed in the next section, the Ninth Circuit Court held that
the Hindes decision incorrectly found shareholders were not a special class which § 1821(d)(15) sought to protect.66 However, the
Ninth Circuit Court limited its decision to suits for accountings
when the FDIC has provided essentially meaningless or insufficient reports to the shareholders of a bank in receivership.67

61. Id. The court again acknowledges that the fourth Cort factor may no longer

be part of the implied cause of action inquiry, but nevertheless applies it to FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc. Id.

62. Id. The court's entire analysis of the fourth prong is as follows:
While the utility of the fourth Cort factor is in doubt, we note that
the claim here is not traditionally relegated to state law. By contrast, in Oliver, the plaintiff was a shareholder with the opportunity

to bring a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation, a cause of
action traditionally relegated to state law. However, in the instant

case, the FDIC's duty to make an accounting arises under federal
law. Thus, the fourth and final factor of the Cort test, whatever its

weight, must be answered in favor of the Plaintiffs.
Id.
63. Id.
64. FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d 1117,1128 (9th Cir. 2000). The court left

for another day the question of whether a member of the general public or a watchdog organization has the same private right of action under the statute. Id. However, the court seemed to indicate they would find a private right of action in favor of
a member of the general public when it stated that "[b]oth shareholders and the gen-

eral public are given a right of access to the information that the FDIC is required to
compile." Id. at 1123.
65. Id. at 1127; Hindes v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 148 (1998).

66. Id. at 1127-28.
67. Id. at 1128.
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III. BACKGROUND LAW
While it may seem that when Congress intends for a class
to have the benefit of a private cause of action in order to enforce
their rights under a statute, "the far better course is to specify as
much when it creates those rights., 68 However, the Supreme
Court has "long recognized that under certain limited circumstances the failure of Congress to do so is not inconsistent with an
intent on its part to have such a remedy available to the persons
benefited by its legislation., 69 When finding an implied cause of
action, the courts must also be careful, not to usurp the powers
granted to Congress by Article III of the United States Constitution7 by "[assuming] the legislative role of creating.., a remedy
and thereby enlarge their jurisdiction."' The Supreme Court, after recognizing the danger of judicially created remedies, narrowed
the test for implied causes of action by setting forth the fourpronged inquiry found in Cort v. Ash.72
In Cort, the Court considered "whether a private cause of
action [should] be implied under... 18 U.S.C. § 610, a criminal
statute prohibiting corporations from making a 'contribution or
expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential
and Vice Presidential electors.., are to be voted for'".73 The
Court systematically applied its four-pronged test 74 to the statute,
and held that the statute did not give rise to an implied cause of ac68. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
69. Id. at 717. The Supreme Court first examined the question of an implied
cause of action in Texas & PacificRailway Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). Id. As
in Cort, the Court in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. looked to the language of the statute. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 689. "Thus, the statutory reference to 'any employee of any
such common carrier' in the 1893 legislation requiring railroads to equip their cars
with secure 'grab irons or handholds,' made 'irresistible' the Court's earliest 'inference of a private right of action'- in that case in favor of a railway employee who was
injured when a grab iron gave way." Id. (quoting Texas & Pacific Railway Co., 241
U.S. at 40) (internal citations omitted).
70. U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 1. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish." Id.
71. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting).
72. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,78-85 (1975).
73. Cort,422 U.S. at 68.
74. Id. at 77. See supra text accompanying note 39.
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tion.75 First, the Court found that the criminal statute could not be
construed to create a right in any particular class of people without
a statutory basis for the inference of the right.76 Second, the Court
found nothing in the Legislative history to indicate congressional
intent to create a right for shareholders to sue for damages under
18 U.S.C. § 610. 7 The Court construed congressional silence
against an implied cause of action, stating that it indicates Congress' desire "that the relationship between corporations and their
stockholders would continue to be entrusted entirely to state
law.0 8 Third, the Court held that a private remedy would not further the legislative purpose of the statute because the recovery of
damages would come only after the corporate influence had its affect on the election. 79 Finally, for the same reasons it articulated in
the second prong-that the shareholder-corporation relationship is
better left to the states-the Court held that the issue should be
relegated to state law.80
Four years after Cort, the Supreme Court, in Cannon v.
University of Chicago, used the four-prong test to find a private
cause of action implied in Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972.81 In Cannon, the plaintiff brought suit against the University of Chicago and Northwestern University alleging that she was
denied admission because of her sex. Unlike the decision in Cort,
the Supreme Court found Title IX to benefit a special class.8 In
the words of the majority:

75. See id. at 78-85.
76. Id. at 79.
77. Id. at 82-83. The Court stated "in situations in which it is clear that federal
law has granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to prove an intention to create a private cause of action." Id. at 82 (emphasis added). However, the
Court went on to say that an explicit purpose to deny one would be controlling. Id.
78. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 83-84 (1975).
79. Id. at 84.

80. Id.
81. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 411 U.S. 677, 688-709 (1979).
82. Id. at 680-82 nn.1-2.
83. Compare id. at 693-94, with Cort, 422 U.S. at 79-80 (holding that the statute in
question "was nothing more that a bare criminal statute, with absolutely no indication that civil enforcement of any kind was available to anyone").
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[t]here would be far less reason to infer a private
remedy in favor of individual persons if Congress,
instead of drafting Title IX with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class, had written it simply as a
ban on discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds or as a prohibition against the disbursement of public funds to educational institutions engaged in discriminatory practices. 84
Additionally, the Court reasoned, Title IX was framed after
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the courts had already
found a cause of action implicit in Title VI. 85 As a result, the
Court held that Congress must have known that Title IX, with
nearly identical language as Title VI, would be treated likewise.86
The Court also found that a private cause of action would enable
an isolated violation to be remedied without terminating federal
financial support and impacting numerous innocent students.8 7 Finally, the Court held that due to the federal nature of Title IX, the
issue could not be relegated to state law.88
The next two decisions further narrowed the test for an implied cause of action.89 Decided shortly after Cannon, both
84. Cannon, 411 U.S. at 690-93.
85. Id. at 696-98.
86. Id.
87. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 411 U.S. 677,704-05 (1979).

88. Id. at 708-09.
89. There is some argument that the new test in Touche Ross & Co. and Transamerica MortgageAdvisors, Inc. overruled the four-prong Cort test. See First Pacific
Bancorp, Inc. v. Heifer, 224 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Touche Ross &
Co v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174,
189 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)). In California v. Sierra Club, Justice Rehnquist
(joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, and Justice Powell) wrote a concurring opinion questioning the emphasis the Court puts on the Cort test. 451 U.S. 287,
302 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). He argued that "in deciding an implied-right-

of-action case courts need not mechanically trudge through all four of the factors
when the dispositive question of legislative intent has been resolved." Sierra Club,

451 U.S. at 302 (citations omitted). In addition, Justice Scalia wrote in a concurring
opinion of Thompson v. Thompson:

I also find misleading the Court's statement that, in determining
the existence of a private right of action, "we have relied on the
four factors set out in Cort v. Ash,... along with other tools of
statutory construction." That is not an accurate description of
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Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,90 and Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,9' emphasize the question of "whether
Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a
private cause of action., 92 The Court found that in both cases the
four prongs of the Cort test were relevant in determining whether
a private remedy exists, but each prong was not entitled to equal
weight. 93

Using the narrowed test, the Touche Ross & Co Court did
not find a private cause of action implied in § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 9' The Court stated "[s]ection 17(a) is
like provisions in countless other statutes that simply require certain regulated businesses to keep records and file periodic reports
to enable the relevant governmental authorities to perform their

what we have done. It could not be plainer that we effectively
overruled the Cortv. Ash analysis in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington... and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, converting one of its four factors (congressional intent) into the determinative factor, with the other thee merely indicative of its
presence or absence.
484 U.S. 174, 189 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original and internal citations omitted). However, the language of Touche Ross & Co. does not seem that
strong. While it is true that the Court in Touche Ross & Co. described the central
inquiry as whether Congress intended to create a private remedy, the Court later
states that "the first three factors discussed in Cort - the language and focus of the
statute, its legislative history, and its purpose, are ones traditionally relied upon in
determining legislative intent." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 57576 (1979) (citations omitted). Rather than expressly overruling the Cort test as Justice Scalia indicates, the author suggests that the Court in Touche Ross & Co. is
merely shifting the weight given to each prong. See id.
90. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
91. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
92. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc., 444 U.S. at 23-24 (quoting Touche
Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at 575-76).
93. Id.
94. See Touche Ross & Co., 442 U.S. at 577. The relevant part of section 17(a)
reads:
Every national securities exchange, every member thereof,... and
every broker or dealer registered pursuant to... this title, shall
make, keep, and preserve for such periods, such accounts, correspondence,... and other records, and make such reports, as the
Commission by its rules and regulations may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)(1970 ed.).
Id. at 568.
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regulatory functions." 95 As such, the Court held that section 17(a)
neither confers rights on a special class, nor prohibits unlawful
conduct; therefore there was no basis for "inferring that a civil
cause of action for damages lay in favor of anyone., 96 The Court
then turned to the legislative history of section 17(a) as indicia of
intent.97 Upon finding that no history of intent existed, the Court
concluded, that in cases where a statute was found not to provide a
benefit to a special class and was devoid of legislative intention to
do so, the inquiry ends.98 At this point the Court deviated from
the Cort decision and found it unnecessary to examine the last two
prongs of the inquiry. 99
In TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc., the Court applied
the new test to two statutes: sections 215 and 206 of the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940.' Although the Congressional Record is silent in respect to section 215, the Court held that a private cause of
action was implicit in the languages of the statute.10' The Court
stated, "[b]y declaring certain contracts void, § 215 by its terms
necessarily contemplates that the issue of voidness under its crite-

95. Touche Ross & Co., v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979).
96. Id. at 571 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,79 (1975)).
97. See id. at 571-74.
98. Id. at 576.
99. See id. at 575-76.
100. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11-25 (1979). Section 206 prohibits investment advisors from defraud clients or prospective clients,
making transactions with clients through their personal accounts without gaining consent from clients, or engage in any act, which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976). The relevant portion of section 215 reads:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this subchapter and every contract heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any
relationship or practice in violation of any provision of this subchapter, or any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, shall be void
(1) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any such
provision, rule, regulation, or order, shall have made or engaged in
the performance of any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights
of any person who, not being a party to such contract, shall have
acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge of the facts
by reason of which the making or performance of such contract
was in violation of any such provision.
15 U.S.C § 80b-15 (1976) (emphasis added).
101. TransamericaMortgageAdvisors, Inc., 444 U.S. at 18.
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ria may be litigated somewhere."' 2 Conversely, the Court held
that section 206 "simply proscribes certain conduct, and does not
in terms create or alter any civil liabilities."' 1' 3 Furthermore, the
Court's analysis of the legislative history revealed that Congress
has expressly provided private remedies in other securities laws
and yet enacted no analogous provisions in the act'0 4 Again, having found that Congress intended no private remedy for section
206, the Court ended its inquiry without considering the third and
fourth prongs of the Cort.105
Only two years after TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc.,
the Supreme Court in California v. Sierra Club apparently revived
and clarified the four-pronged test originally set forth in Cort.'6
The Court stated, "these four factors present the relevant inquiries
to pursue in answering the recurring question of implied causes of
action.'' 0 7 Accordingly, the Court applied Cort to section 10 of the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899.208 First, the Court
held that while it is possible for someone to benefit from section
10, the analysis under Cort is whether "Congress intended to confer federal rights upon those beneficiaries."'0 9 Here, the Court answered in the negative." 0 More specifically, the Court found that
the statute does no more than state a general proscription of conduct; therefore it implies no private remedy."' Furthermore, the
Court construed congressional silence concerning remedies as indicative that "Congress was concerned not with private rights but
the Federal Government's ability to respond to obstructions on
navigable waterways.' ' 2 Clarifying the Cort test, the Court con102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 23-24.

106. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287,292-93 (1981).
107. Id. at 293. The four factors are the means through which the ultimate issue,
congressional intent, can be discerned. Id.
108. Id. at 289. Section 10 provides: "The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the
United States is prohibited ....
" 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994).

109. Id. at 294 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 693 n.13 (1979)).
110. Id.

111. Id.
112. Id. at 296.
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cluded that "only ...if the first two factors give indication of congressional intent to create the remedy," was it necessary to explore
whether a private remedy would advance the purpose of the statute or if the issue is appropriate for federal litigation."'
The Supreme Court in Thompson v. Thompson" 4 upheld
the use of the clarified four-prong inquiry found in California v.
Sierra Club."5 The Court stated that their focus on congressional
intent does not mean that they must find evidence of an express
intent to create a private cause of action in the Congressional Record.' 1 6 If that were so, the Court believed, "[t]he implied cause of
action doctrine would be a virtual dead letter were it limited to
correcting drafting errors when Congress simply forgot to codify
its evident intention to provide a cause of action..' ... Rather, the
Court fell back on the Cort test to determine whether Congress intended a private remedy." 8 In this case, the Court analyzed the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980,28 U.S.C. § 1738(A),
holding that the Act did not meet the Cort test; consequently, a
private remedy was not to be found." 9
None of the cases discussed have been expressly overruled.
Consequently, the doctrine of implied causes of action is somewhat unclear. 120 It is apparent that the four prongs of Cort are still
viable in some form, and the Supreme Court's focus on congressional intent is also clear.' 2 1 What is not clear, however, is whether
a court must, or should, apply each of the four Cort factors to the
statute, and what weight, if any, should be given to each factor in
the analysis. 2 2 Accordingly, which version of the test a court
113. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298 (1981).
114. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1987).
115. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 297-298 (1981).
116. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 179-80.
119. Id. at 175-76, 187. The statute, in relevant part reads: "The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, any child custody determination
made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State." 28
U.S.C § 1738A(a) (1980).
120. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
121. See First Pacific Bancorp, Inc. v. Helfer, 224 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (9th Cir.

2000).
122. See id. at 1121 (citing California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287,293 (1981)).
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adopts plays a significant role in the outcome of a decision.1
In Hindes v. FDIC, the Third Circuit Court chose not to
analyze 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15), the same statute at issue in First
Pacific Bancorp, Inc., under the last two prongs of Cort. As a result, the Hindes Court found that no private remedy existed.1 24
The relevant facts of this case are substantially similar to those in
FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc.12' The appellants are shareholders of a
bank of which the FDIC was appointed receiver. 126 After the bank
went into receivership, the appellants contend that the FDIC
failed to produce a statutorily required accounting report in accordance with the accounting and reporting standards of the FDIC to
the shareholders.127 The shareholders brought suit against the
FDIC to enforce the statute and compel a full accounting. 28
The Hindes court, relying on the language in California v.
29
Sierra Club, focused its analysis on the first two prongs of Cort1
The circuit court held that the shareholders of the bank are not
members of a special class to which Congress granted special rights
under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15). 3 ° As evidence, the circuit court
pointed to the language of the statute: "the plain language of the
statute puts shareholders on par with members of the general public. The statute gives shareholders and members of the public
identical rights-the FDIC must make the annual report available
to either upon request-and the statute establishes these rights in
the same subsection."' 131 Consequently, the court did not feel
123. See id. at 1121-22.
124. Hindes v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 148, 172 (1998). The decision of Hindes in respect
to its analysis of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15) is very short, taking up less than one page.

Id. In comparison, the court in FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc. wrote over six pages in its
analysis of the issue. 224 F.3d at 1122-28. While the length of a decision is hardly indicative of its competence, it is interesting that the Hindes court was so cursory in its

analysis.
125. See Hindes, 137 F.3d at 153-55. In 1992 the Secretary of Banking for the state
of Pennsylvania closed Meritor Savings Bank and appointed the FDIC as receiver.

Id. at 153. The plaintiff's sought a full accounting of the receivership activities from
the FDIC pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15). Id. at 171.
126. Id. at 153.

127. Id. at 171.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 172 (stating "[b]ecause the first two Cort factors are not satisfied, our
inquiry ends here.") (citing California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287,298 (1981)).
130. Hindes v. FDIQ 137 F.3d 148,172 (2000).
131. Id.
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compelled to distinguish the shareholders as a special class apart
from the general public.13 The circuit court concluded with a cursory analysis of legislative intent.133 Finding the Congressional Record silent, the court simply held that there was no indication of
13 4
intent by Congress to imply a private remedy.
IV. ANALYSIS

Taking the background law into consideration, the first decision the Ninth Circuit Court had to make in First Pacific Bancorp, Inc. was which test for an implied right of action the court
was to adopt. 35 The court recognized that the Supreme Court had
seemingly used several variations of the Cort test, and also the
possibility that Cort was no longer good law. 3 6 Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit stated that they found the four-prong test in Cort
helpful in analyzing whether 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15) implies a pri137
vate cause of action.
The court's adoption of all four prongs of Cort is not inconsistent with the relevant case law. 138 The Supreme Court has never
expressly overruled Cort, nor ever indicated that any of its four

132. Id. But see First Pacific Bancorp, Inc. v. Heifer, 224 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir.
2000). The Court stated:
We note that the district court, agreeing with the FDIC, reasoned

that subsection (15)(C) places the shareholders on the same footing as the public in general. According to the district court, this
eliminates the possibility that the statute was enacted for the benefit of the shareholders. This view is not correct. Both shareholders
and the general public are given a right of access to the information that the FDIC is required to compile.
Id.
133. Hindes,137 F.3d at 172.
134. Id.
135. FirstPacificBancorp,Inc., 224 F.3d at 1121-1122.
136. Id. at 1121-22. "Indeed, there has even been some suggestion that Cort has
been overruled." Id.
137. Id.

138. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981). The Court stated,
"Combined, these four factors present the relevant inquiries to pursue in answering
the recurring question of implied causes of action. Cases subsequent to Cort have

explained that the ultimate issue is whether Congress intended to create a private
right of action; but the four factors specified in Cort remain the 'criteria through
which this intent could be discerned."' Id. (internal citations omitted).
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factors were excluded from the analysis. 139 The Court has, in
TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc. and Touche Ross & Co., in140
dicated that the factors do not necessarily carry equal weight.
However, weighing the factors never became necessary for the
Ninth Circuit Court because all four factors pointed toward an im14
plied cause of action. '
After adopting the Cort test, the court decided that First
Pacific was a member of a special class for which 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(15) was enacted. 42 The language of the statute specifically states that the shareholder of a bank in receivership is entitled to a copy of the report the FDIC prepares, in accordance with
14
its own accounting standards, for the government agencies. 1
Thus, as the court reasoned, the provision puts the shareholders on
the same footing as the government agencies, and thereby singles
them out as members of a special class.1 44
'
The Supreme Court's decisions in this area support the
Ninth Circuit's conclusion. 145 In Cannon, the Court drew the distinction between laws that are enacted for the protection of the
general public and those focusing on a special class. 146 For example, the language of Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 provides in part that "[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educa-

139. See, First Pacific Bancorp, Inc. v. Heifer, 224 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (9th Cir.

2000).
140. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23 (1979);

Touche Ross & Co v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979).
141. First Pacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1129 ("Applying each factor of the
Cort test leads us to conclude that Congress intended to create a private right of action in favor of the shareholder of failed financial institutions to enforce §
1821(d)(15)(B) and (C) and § 1821(d)(11)(C)."); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 709 (1979) ("In sum, there is no need in this case to weigh the four Cort factors; all of them support the same result.")
142. FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1123.

143. 12 U.S.C. §1821(d)(15)(C) (1994).
144. First Pacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1122. The distinction between the
government agencies and the shareholders is that the FDIC has a burden of production with respect to the government agencies, while the shareholder has the burden

of request. Id.
145. Id.
146. Cannon,441 U.S. at 690-93.
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147
tion program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.'
Rather than merely prohibiting discriminatory conduct, the statute
clearly focuses on the individual who is being discriminated against
and identifies that person as a member of a special class for whom
the statute was enacted. 14 Likewise, Congress wrote 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(15) specifically listing those who are entitled to receive the
FDIC's report rather than simply requiring the FDIC to obey its
1 49
own accounting standards.
The Supreme Court's decision in Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. also supports the Ninth Circuit Court's finding that
the plaintiffs in First Pacific Bancorp, Inc. were a special class. 5
As discussed above, section 215 of the Investment Advisors Act of
15
1940 declares contracts made in violation of the section void. '
The Court recognized that Congress anticipated the possibility of
litigation arising out of that language even though no private cause
of action is expressly provided in the statute. 52 Thus, the statute
was created for the benefit of a special class, those who were
harmed by a violation of section 215.153 Similarly, in First Pacific
Bancorp, Inc., the court determined that 12 U.S.C. § 1281(d)(15)
gives the plaintiff a statutory right to the FDIC's report, and,
therefore, the "'customary legal incidents,"' in this case an ac54
counting, of the plaintiff's right should follow.

147. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
148. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-93 (1979).
149. The statute states that the FDIC shall make available any report produced
under the statute to any shareholder of the receivership. 12 U.S.C § 1821(d)(15)(C)
(1994).

150. First Pacific Bancorp, Inc. v. Heifer, 224 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc., v. Lewis 441 U.S. 11, 19 (1979)).
151. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
152. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979).
153. Id. The Court stated that,

[a]t the very least Congress must have assumed that § 215 could be
raised defensively in private litigation to preclude the enforcement
of an investment advisers contract. But the legal consequences of

voidness are typically not so limited. A person with the power to
avoid a contract ordinarily may resort to a court to have the contract rescinded and to obtain restitution of consideration paid.
Id.
154. FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc. 224 F.3d at 1123 (quoting TransamericaMortgage

Advisors, Inc., 444 U.S. at 19).
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Although 12 U.S.C § 1281(d)(15)(C) places the shareholders on the same footing as the government agencies, the subsection
also lists the general public as being entitled to receive the FDIC's
report. 155 The Third Circuit Court in Hindes focused on this language and held that shareholders were not members of any special
156
class which Congress intended to benefit under the statute.
However, the Ninth Circuit in FirstPacificBancorp, Inc., as well as
Judge Roth's dissenting opinion in Hindes, stated the Hindes decision ignored the possibility that the general public and the shareholders were listed in the statute to grant both the same benefit of
a private cause of action.'57 In addition, the Ninth Circuit in First
Pacific Bancorp, Inc. considered another plausible reading of the
58
statute's mention of both shareholders and the general public.
The fact that shareholders were specifically listed and not merely
consolidated with the reference to the general public distinguishes
shareholders as a special class apart from the general public. 5 9
The court concluded that this reading of the statute allows both
shareholders and the general public to request the FDIC's report,
but a private right of action to enforce the statutory requirement
lies only with the shareholders. 6
155. Id. at 1122; Hindes v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 148, 172 (1998). The statute states:
"Any report prepared pursuant to subparagraph (B) shall be made available by the
Corporation upon request to any shareholderof the depository institution for which
the Corporation was appointed conservator or receiver or any other member of the
public." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15)(C) (1994) (emphasis added). Subparagraph B requires "the Corporation shall make an annual accounting or report, as appropriate,
available to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Comptroller General of the United
States, and the authoritywhich appointedthe Corporationas conservatoror receiver."
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15)(B) (1994) (emphasis added).
156. Hindes, 137 F.3d at 172.
157. First Pacific Bancorp, Inc. v. Heifer 224 F.3d 1117,1123 (9th Cir. 2000);
Hindes, 137 F.3d at 172 (Roth, J., concurring and dissenting). Circuit Judge Roth's
dissent reads in part,
I conclude from the above statutory language that the shareholders, as well as the general public, have the right to an annual report
which has been prepared in a manner which is consistent with the
accounting and reporting practices established by the FDIC. It has
not been documented on the record here that the annual reports
supplied to appellants by the FDIC do conform to such practices.
Hindes, 137 F.3d at 172 (Roth, J., concurring and dissenting).
158. FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1127.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit also disagreed with the decision in
Hindes that there was no indication of congressional intent to create a remedy."' While the court in Hindes interpreted legislative
silence as signaling no congressional intent, the court in First Pacific Bancorp, Inc. reasoned if that were necessarily true, the Supreme Court would not have developed a test for an implied private right of action. 162 The court further relied on the Supreme
Court's observation that unless a statute expressly states, or at
least strongly indicates, the courts are restricted from exercising
their jurisdiction in equity, the court's full power in that jurisdiction is to be applied.1 61 In FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc., the remedy
sought, an accounting, is an equitable one and 12 U.S.C. §
1281(d)(15) does not strip away the power of the courts to render
remedies in equity by either specific language or strong implication.' 6 As a result, the presumption found in First Pacific Bancorp, Inc. despite Congress' silence an individual may pursue a
16
claim appears to be valid. 1
The background law in this area further supports the Ninth
Circuit's finding. In Cort, the Supreme Court stated as long as it
can be shown that a statute was designed to benefit a specific class,
it is not necessary to show an explicit intention by Congress to create a private cause of action. 166 In FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc., the
court found 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15) benefited the shareholders;
therefore, it is a logical assumption that the benefit was not cre1 67
ated without a means of enforcing it.
161. Id. The entire analysis of legislative intent performed by the Hindes court
reads: "Further, the legislative history is silent as to whether Congress intended to
create a private remedy." Hindes v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 148, 172 (1998). In FirstPacific
Bancorp, Inc., the Ninth Circuit responded to this cursory analysis: "As we have already pointed out, silence does not necessarily mean that no remedy is intended."
224 F.3d at 1127.
162. FirstPacificBancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1124.
163. First Pacific Bancorp, Inc. v, Heifer 224 F.3d 1117,1125 (9th Cir. 2000).
164. Id. at 1125.
165. Id.
166. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975). Of course, an expressed purpose to deny
a private cause of action would control. Id.
167. First PacificBancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1125-26. The court applied the "logic
of TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc.," stating, "we can say that Congress would
not create a right in the shareholders to access the financial reports without a concomitant expectation that the information itself would be available to examine." Id.
See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979) ("For
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In its discussion of the third Cort factor, the Ninth Circuit
Court determined the means of enforcing the FDIC's duty, an ac-

counting, is consistent with the underlying purpose of 12 U.S.C. §
1821(d)(15). 6 ' The court found one purpose of the statute was to

improve the supervision of banks by strengthening accounting
standards.'6 9 By allowing private enforcement of the statute's provisions, the court helped to ensure the FDIC used the appropriate
accounting standards. 170 Furthermore, the statute provides no

other enforcement provision or indication as to who may compel
an accounting.' 7 ' The statute does, however, specifically list share-

holders, along with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Comptroller
General of the United States and the authority that appointed the
FDIC receiver, as a class entitled to receive the FDIC's report.'7 2
As discussed above, the court could find no reason to distinguish
the rights of the governmental agencies from those of the share-

holders to enforce the benefits provided in the statute. 173 Therefore, in order to avoid an outcome that renders a requirement created by Congress unenforceable, the court recognized an implied

remedy in the shareholders.' 74
In recognizing the private cause of action, the court rejected the FDIC's argument that the requirement of providing the
annual accounting would be overly burdensome.' 7 The court
found providing additional copies of a report the FDIC was al-

ready statutorily required to make was not imposing any further
these reasons we conclude that when Congress declared in § 215 that certain contracts are void, it intended that the customary legal incidents of voidness would follow, including the availability of a suit for an injunction against continued operation
of the contract and for restitution.")
168. First Pacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1127. The Hindes court found it unnecessary to explore the last two prongs of Cort after deciding the first two were not
met. Hindes v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 148, 172 (1998) (citing California v. Sierra Club, 451
U.S. 287, 298 (1981)). Consequently, the court never made it to this prong of the
Cort analysis. Id.
169. First Pacific Bancorp, Inc v. Helfer., 224 F.3d 1117, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000)
(quoting H.R. CONF.REP.No. 101-222, at 393 (1989)).
170. FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1127.
171. Id. at 1126.
172. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15) (1994).
173. FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1122. See supra 144 and accompanying
text.
174. See id. at 1122-1128.
175. First Pacific Bancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d 1117,1127 (9th Cir. 2000).
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duties, but rather was ensuring the FDIC fulfill the obligations
mandated by Congress. 176 Therefore, the court's holding imposed
17 7
no additional burdens on the FDIC.
The analysis of the fourth Cort factor in the First Pacific
Bancorp, Inc. case is very simple. 78 The FDIC's duty to make an
accounting of the receivership arises under federal law.
Consequently, the cause of action cannot be relegated to state law.1°
This outcome is substantiated by the Supreme Court's finding in
Cannon. In Cannon, the Court held that because the case dealt
with the expenditure of federal funds, there could be no question
but that the fourth factor supports an implied cause of action in
181
the federal courts.
V.

CONCLUSION

Using the Cort test, it is clear the implication of a private
right of action under 12 U.S.C. §1821(d)(15) is not outside the authority of the courts. 8 2 However, beyond the Cort test there may
be an even greater reason to imply a private remedy. No other
group listed in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15) as entitled to receive a copy
of the FDIC's report has more at stake than the shareholders of
the bank in receivership. This case arose when the shareholders of
First Pacific, expecting a receivership surplus in the neighborhood
of $2.8 million, received six pages of unaudited reports from the
FDIC indicating a net loss for the receivership.' 83 The reports contained bare-bone financial data and did not report the sale of accounts to other banks, or financial information on several large
settlements the FDIC negotiated during the receivership. 4 The
Hindes decision, and the district court's decision in First Pacific
176. Id.
177. Id.

178. The First Pacific Bancorp, Inc. court used only four sentences of its 10-page
decision to analyze this prong of Cort. See id. at 1127.
179. Id. at 1127; see 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15) (1994).
180. FirstPacificBancorp, Inc., 224 F.3d at 1127.
181. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,708-09 (1979).

182. See First Pacific Bancorp, Inc. v. Heifer, 224 F.3d 1117, 1127-28 (9th Cir.
2000).
183. Holding Company,supra note 8 at 5.
184. Id.
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Bancorp, Inc., suggest the shareholders of the banks must simply
185
accept this conduct, even when millions of dollars are at stake.
In essence, those decisions allow the FDIC to act without accountability to the shareholders, a position which is seemingly unsustainable in light of the Congressionally created accounting and reporting requirements found in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15).' 86
The law after the FirstPacific Bancorp,Inc. case, at least in
the Ninth Circuit, forces the FDIC to exercise greater care in its
accounting of receiverships as required by the statute. For the
shareholders of banks, this strengthening of accounting and reporting standards allows them to see exactly how the assets of the defaulted bank are treated by the FDIC in its receiver capacity.187 In

the instance of the First Pacific Bancorp, Inc., the Ninth Circuit's
decision requires the FDIC to disclose to the shareholders how the
$4,274,000 receivership surplus became a net lOSS. 188 In addition,
the shareholders are entitled to a report covering the sale of First
Pacific's accounts to Commercial Central Bank. 189 The First Pacific Bancorp, Inc. decision ensures the appropriate financial records are maintained and disclosed by the FDIC in accordance
with 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15). 9 ' In order to further the purpose of
the statute, the FirstPacific Bancorp, Inc. court's finding of an implied private cause of action for an accounting should be upheld.
NATHAN FESS

185. See id. at 1119.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 1126.
Holding Company, supra note 8 at 5.
Id.
Id.
First Pacific Bancorp, Inc. v. Helfer, 224 F.3d 1117, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000).
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